Smoke and Mirrors: How Current Firearm Relinquishment Laws Fail to Protect Domestic Violence Victims by Gildengorin, Laura Lee
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 67 | Issue 3 Article 5
4-2016
Smoke and Mirrors: How Current Firearm
Relinquishment Laws Fail to Protect Domestic
Violence Victims
Laura Lee Gildengorin
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Laura Lee Gildengorin, Smoke and Mirrors: How Current Firearm Relinquishment Laws Fail to Protect Domestic Violence Victims, 67
Hastings L.J. 807 (2016).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol67/iss3/5




Smoke and Mirrors: How Current Firearm 
Relinquishment Laws Fail to Protect Domestic 
Violence Victims 
Laura Lee Gildengorin* 
In 2011, two-thirds of murdered women died at the hands of a current or former intimate 
partner who used a firearm. Thus, it is imperative to remove guns from the control of 
domestic violence offenders. With increased media coverage, domestic violence is at the 
forefront of the minds of many, but this growing awareness is not a new phenomenon. 
The federal government recognized the terrors of domestic offenders and firearms in two 
amendments to the Gun Control Act in 1994 and 1996, respectively. 
 
In this Note, I examine the federal and state approaches of gun relinquishment laws 
pertaining to domestic violence offenders. The federal laws, although worthy of 
recognition, have done very little to actually compel offenders to give up their weapons. 
Instead, state and local laws are necessary to achieve this end since the triggering events 
(for example, a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction or a domestic violence 
restraining order) are widely dealt with on a state level. Currently, however, the states 
provide us with a broad range of statutory approaches, from nonexistent to quite 
impressive. 
 
My conclusion provides for a set of possible reforms to bolster the success of the federal 
and state laws. One must not forget that the goal of these provisions is to protect domestic 
violence victims from perpetrators who are often manipulative and vengeful. Thus, swift 
and deliberate action must be taken to seize offenders’ firearms. The potential consequences 
of not doing so—the deaths of innocent victims—are unacceptable. 
 
 * First and foremost, I need to thank Professor D. Kelly Weisberg for not only helping me write 
this Note, but also encouraging me to. She has been a wonderful teacher to me, as well as a strong 
support system. My sincere thanks go to Elizabeth Lee, Mohneet Dhaliwal, and Traci Aoki for reading 
and providing comments on my drafts. I would also like to thank the Hastings Law Journal for 
selecting this Note for publication. I could not be more honored. Lastly, I would like to thank my 
mother, Ginny, my father, Michael, and my brother, Aaron, for making this all possible for me. 
Without you, I would not be in the position I am to stand up and fight for victims and survivors. 
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“I’ve never hurt anybody. I’m not a violent man, but I do collect 
firearms,” said Ian Elias in a video that he posted online on Saturday, 
November 8, 2014.1 “The judge said I’m not allowed to say anything 
about any of this to anybody and I’m not allowed to have any guns.”2 
Two days later, his ex-wife, Nicolette Elias, was found murdered.3 After 
 
 1. Autopsy: Man Who Shot and Killed Ex-Wife Used Gun, Arrows, Fox 12 Oregon (Nov. 11, 
2014, 6:26 PM), http://www.kptv.com/story/27359254/autopsy-man-who-shot-and-killed-ex-wife-used-
gun-arrows. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Maxine Bernstein, Portland Man Faced Restraining and Stalking Orders for Escalating Threats 
Before He Killed Ex-Wife, Then Self, Oregonian (Nov. 10, 2014, 7:26 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/ 
portland/index.ssf/2014/11/portland_man_faced_restraining.html. 
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shooting Nicolette, Ian took his own life.4 In the year prior to her 
untimely death, Nicolette had repeatedly told authorities that Ian was a 
violent man.5 In restraining and stalking orders, Nicolette alleged that he 
had physically and sexually abused her on several occasions, including 
some incidents in front of their children.6 More specifically, she wrote 
that he “pushed, choked, slapped and punched her in the face and 
dragged her on the floor.”7 
Nicolette took all of the steps that domestic violence victim 
advocates would have encouraged her to take. In the months leading up 
to her murder, she arranged safety plans, adjusted her daily routines, and 
obtained both restraining and stalking orders against Ian.8 In the 
restraining order petition, Nicolette noted that he “regularly kept high-
powered firearms in the home.”9 Ian had even posted photographs of 
himself “with an M1 carbine, a Ruger P89, [and] ‘my AR15’” on 
Facebook.10 By May 7 of that year, a judge ordered that all firearms be 
removed from Ian’s possession.11 Following the murder-suicide, the judge 
who had presided over the couple’s custody and parenting time case 
commented that “[a]ll of the professionals in the case, including the 
court, were extremely concerned about Ian Elias and took his behavior 
seriously.”12 Even so, in the morning hours of November 10, 2014, Ian 
Elias, armed with a gun and a bow and arrow, entered his ex-wife’s home 
and murdered her.13 
Guns in the hands of domestic abusers pose a severe and distinct 
threat to the victims of domestic violence.14 In the United States, over 
twelve million women and men are victims of some sort of domestic 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Maxine Bernstein, Man Kills Ex-Wife in SW Portland, Then Kills Himself, Police Say; 
2 Daughters Safe, Oregonian (Nov. 10, 2014, 4:13 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/ 
2014/11/man_kills_ex-wife_in_sw_portla.html#incart_river (describing Nicolette Elias’ allegations 
against Ian Elias). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. (describing the numerous times that Nicolette Elias had sought court intervention to 
protect her from her ex-husband, Ian Elias). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Sunshine Simmons, A Portland Man Murders Wife, Abducts Children, Then Kills Himself, 
Examiner (Nov. 11, 2014, 12:10 AM), http://www.examiner.com/article/a-portland-man-murders-wife-
abducts-children-then-kills-himself; see also Bernstein, supra note 3. 
 11. Bernstein, supra note 3 (explaining that the order to remove all firearms from Ian Elias was 
connected to the grant of a temporary stalking restraining order). 
 12. Amy Holmes Hehn, ‘Heartsick’ Elias-case Judge Challenges Domestic Violence Myths: 
Guest Opinion, Oregonian (Nov. 11, 2014, 3:15 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/11/ 
heartsick_elias-case_judge_tak.html (discussing Nicolette’s attempts to convey how dangerous Ian was 
and how hard the court tried to protect her). 
 13. Autopsy: Man Who Shot and Killed Ex-Wife Used Gun, Arrows, supra note 1. 
 14. Winnie Stachelberg et al., Ctr. for Am. Progress, Preventing Domestic Abusers and Stalkers 
from Accessing Guns (May 9, 2013). 
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violence annually.15 Of those victims, 1.3 million women and 835,000 men 
suffer from physical abuse.16 Further, there are approximately 16,800 
domestic violence homicides annually.17 Approximately five percent of 
domestic violence incidents against women are carried out with the use 
of a firearm.18 Just over sixteen percent of murder victims are killed by an 
intimate partner.19 In other words, on average, three women are killed by 
their intimate partner each day.20 If an abuser owns a gun, the female 
victim is five times more likely to be killed.21 When a gun is used in a 
domestic violence assault, it is twelve times more likely to result in death 
than when compared to assaults using other weapons or bodily force.22 
Time and time again, “the difference between a battered woman and a 
dead woman is the presence of a gun.”23 
This Note argues that current firearm laws for restricting domestic 
violence offenders’ possession of guns are ineffective because they lack 
strong relinquishment provisions. Part I explains the scope of current 
federal gun relinquishment laws, including the impact of the recent 
Supreme Court cases, United States v. Castleman24 and Henderson v. 
United States,25 and highlights their shortcomings. Part II turns to the 
current legal landscape of state gun relinquishment laws and highlights 
the different levels of success in the states’ efforts to fill the legal gaps 
within the federal laws. Part III concludes with various proposals to 
improve gun relinquishment laws. Specifically, Congress could incentivize 
states to develop and implement state relinquishment laws, improve the 
background check system, and provide states with a detailed 
 
 15. Domestic (Intimate Partner) Violence Fast Facts, CNN (Sept. 9, 2014, 3:26 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/06/us/domestic-intimate-partner-violence-fast-facts/ (citing M. C. Black 
et al., Nat’l Ctr. for Injury Prevention & Control, The National Intimate Partner and Sexual 
Violence Survey (NISVS): 2010 Summary Report (2011)). 
 16. How Widespread Is Intimate Partner Violence?, Nat’l Inst. of Justice (Oct. 24, 2007), 
http://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/intimate-partner-violence/Pages/extent.aspx. 
 17. Domestic Violence Facts, Nat’l Coal. Against Domestic Violence 1 n.19 (July 2007).  
 18. Civic Research Institute, Intimate Partner Violence: Spotlight on Victimization, 1993–2011, 
Domestic Violence Rep. 39 (2014) (citing data from 2002 to 2011). 
 19. Alexia Cooper & Erica L. Smith, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Homicide Trends in the United 
States, 1980–2008: Annual Rates for 2009 and 2010, at 18 (Nov. 2011) (explaining that 16.3% of 
murder victims, between 1980 and 2008, were killed by intimate partners). “Intimate partner 
homicides make up 40–50 percent of all murders of women in the United States.” How Widespread Is 
Intimate Partner Violence?, supra note 16. 
 20. Domestic (Intimate Partner) Violence Fast Facts, supra note 15. 
 21. Domestic Violence Facts, supra note 17 (citing Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors 
for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a Multisite Control Study, 93 Am. J. Pub. Health 
1089, 1092 (July 2003)). 
 22. Domestic Violence and Firearms Policy Summary, Law Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence (May 
11, 2014), http://smartgunlaws.org/domestic-violence-firearms-policy-summary/. 
 23. 142 Cong. Rec. S11227 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (quoting 
Senator Wellstone’s earlier remark). 
 24. 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014).  
 25. 135 S. Ct. 1780 (2015). 
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implementation plan so they conform better to federal mandates. In 
order to evaluate firearm relinquishment laws, and to advance reforms 
that can increase the safety of victims, it is important to first look to the 
federal provisions. 
I.  Federal Gun Relinquishment Laws 
Federal statutes and case law provide the backdrop for an analysis 
of the effectiveness of gun relinquishment laws. Although an increased 
awareness of the dangers of domestic violence pointed the spotlight on 
the federal government to respond to this silent epidemic, the resulting 
statutes are anything but perfect. Furthermore, the disparate responses 
of the multiple players responsible for implementing and executing these 
statutes make for an unpredictable result. Understanding the federal gun 
relinquishment laws begins with an examination of the 1994 Gun Control 
Act amendment and the Lautenberg Amendment of 1996, which focus 
on removing firearms from the hands of domestic violence perpetrators. 
A. The Gun Control Act Amendment of 1994 
The federal gun relinquishment laws are compiled in the Gun 
Control Act amendment of 1994 and the Lautenberg Amendment of 
1996. The Gun Control Act, passed in 196826 in response to escalating 
urban violence, intended to help the fight against crime while protecting 
the rights of gun owners.27 Prior to 1994, the Gun Control Act kept 
firearms and ammunition out of the hands of certain designated persons, 
such as convicted felons, drug addicts,28 and mentally ill persons,29 by 
precluding them from possessing, purchasing, or selling firearms. The 
legislature attempted to accomplish this preclusion by making it unlawful 
for people to sell or “otherwise dispose of” firearms to the designated 
persons.30 In 1994, as risks posed by domestic violence offenders 
possessing guns became increasingly clear to lawmakers, Congress 
amended the Gun Control Act to include offenders subject to a domestic 
 
 26. See 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2015). 
 27. James O’Connor, Note, Criminal Law—“But I Didn’t Know Who He Was!”: What Is the 
Required Mens Rea for an Aider and Abettor of a Felon in Possession of a Firearm?, 32 W. New Eng. 
L. Rev. 245, 256 (2010); see Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 101, 82 Stat. 1213, 1213 
(1968) (codified as amended throughout 18 U.S.C.) (“The Congress hereby declares that the purpose 
of this title is to provide support to . . . officials in their fight against crime and violence.”). 
 28. Drug addict is defined in the Act as “any individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug so 
as to endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so far addicted to the use of 
narcotic drugs as to have lost the power of self-control with reference to his addiction.” 21 U.S.C. 
§ 802(1). 
 29. Mentally ill person is defined in the Act as one who “has been adjudicated as a mental 
defective or has been committed to any mental institution.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4). 
 30. See Gun Control Act, § 101. 
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violence restraining order in the list of persons excluded from possessing 
or purchasing a firearm.31 
Despite this step toward broader relinquishment, this revision 
includes three limitations that hinder its effectiveness. First, the 
prohibition only lasts as long as the order is in place, so offenders have 
the ability to possess firearms as soon as the restraining order expires.32 
Second, it is subject to an “official-use” exemption that permits law 
enforcement officers, military personnel, and other government 
employees who use weapons in their official duties to evade this 
provision.33 Third, in order to be subject to the restrictions, the offender 
must be considered an intimate partner to the victim.34 As part of this 
amendment, Congress defined the term “intimate partner” as “with 
respect to a person, the spouse . . . , a former spouse . . . , an individual 
who is a parent of a child of the person, and an individual who 
cohabitates or has cohabitated with the person.”35 This definition is too 
narrow as it excludes dating relationships where the partners have not 
lived together or do not share a child, thereby eliminating one of the 
most common types of abusive relationships.36 Although this was a step 
in the right direction, Congress quickly became aware that more changes 
needed to occur, and subsequently passed the Lautenberg Amendment. 
B. The Lautenberg Amendment 
In 1996, armed with mounting data on the harmful link between 
firearms and domestic violence, Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.) 
introduced another amendment to the Gun Control Act to supplement 
the 1994 amendment.37 Widely known as the Lautenberg Amendment, 
this provision, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), sought to protect 
 
 31. See Emily J. Sack, Courts Responding to Domestic Violence: Confronting the Issue of Gun 
Seizure in Domestic Violence Cases, 6 J. Ctr. for Families, Child. & the Cts. 3, 12 (2005). 
 32. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110401, 
108 Stat. 2014, 2014–15 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000)). 
 33. Sack, supra note 31, at 4. 
 34. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2000). 
 35. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(32) (2000). 
 36. Domestic Violence and Firearms Policy Summary, supra note 22 (citing a 2008 study where 
almost half of all domestic violence homicide victims were killed by their current dating partner and 
another study finding that the most common relationship type for restraining order applicants in Los 
Angeles was a dating relationship). 
 37. Jessica A. Golden, Examining the Lautenberg Amendment in the Civilian and Military 
Contexts: Congressional Overreaching, Statutory Vagueness, Ex Post Facto Violations, and 
Implementational Flaws, 29 Fordham Urb. L.J. 427, 428–29 (2001) (“Citing national domestic violence 
statistics including the percentage of domestic violence homicides involving firearms each year, 
Senator Lautenberg intended to close a dangerous loophole in the Gun Control Act enabling domestic 
violence offenders to evade an additional felony conviction for gun possession by getting domestic 
violence felony charges reduced to misdemeanors.”); see also id. at 428 n.5 (explaining that four 
months after the provision passed in the Senate, President Clinton signed the Amendment into law as 
part of the 1997 Consolidated Omnibus Appropriations Act). 
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domestic violence victims in the vast number of cases where domestic 
violence crimes were pleaded down from felonies to misdemeanors.38 
Specifically, it prohibited the possession of any firearm or ammunition by 
anyone previously convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence” (“MCDV”) and proscribed the act of selling or disposing of a 
firearm by a gratuitous transfer to a convicted domestic violence 
misdemeanant.39 The statute immediately begs the question: what exactly 
qualifies as an MCDV? 
Congress defined the term “misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence” in a specific manner as an offense that “is a misdemeanor 
under Federal, State, or Tribal law . . . [and] has, as an element, the use or 
attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, 
committed by [an intimate partner].”40 This is the only federal law that 
prohibits gun possession by a misdemeanant,41 signaling Congress’ 
recognition of the significant risk posed by domestic violence offenders. 
However, the federal law did not enumerate the specific misdemeanors 
that would serve as predicate offenses, forcing the states to devise their 
own lists of state-specific offenses that they deem to be in tune with the 
spirit of the statute. This lack of specificity creates confusion as to what 
crimes actually qualify an offender for the federal relinquishment laws.42 
Nonetheless, the law did specify that the qualifying misdemeanor must 
include the use of “physical force” or “threatened use of a deadly 
weapon,”43 foreshadowing the need for the judiciary to further define 
these terms. 
In addition to the ambiguous language of the statute, the substantive 
requirements also pose significant hurdles when attempting to utilize the 
federal firearms laws. Notably, a conviction, not merely an indictment, is 
necessary to trigger the Lautenberg Amendment, providing several 
loopholes to perpetrators. For example, a domestic violence misdemeanant 
would not be excluded from firearm ownership if there had been a 
“withhold of adjudication,” an “adjournment in contemplation of 
dismissal,” a “deferred adjudication,” or if the record had been expunged 
or set aside.44 This conviction requirement is problematic because these 
nonconviction outcomes do not mean that the defendant is any less guilty 
 
 38. Sack, supra note 31, at 4; United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 426 (2009) (“Existing felon-in-
possession laws, Congress recognized, were not keeping firearms out of the hands of domestic abusers, 
because ‘many people who engage in serious spousal or child abuse ultimately are not charged with or 
convicted of felonies.’”). 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2015). 
 40. 18 U.S.C. § 921(33)(A) (2015) (emphasis added). 
 41. Amy Karan & Helen Stampalia, Domestic Violence and Firearms: A Deadly Combination; 
The Juxtaposition of Federal and Florida Laws, 79 Fla. B.J. 79, 80 (2005). 
 42. This confusion is evident in United States v. Castleman discussed in Part I.C. 
 43. 18 U.S.C. § 921(33)(A) (2015). 
 44. Karan & Stampalia, supra note 41, at 80. 
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or dangerous than those who end up being convicted within the narrow 
bounds of the amendment. Furthermore, the defendant must have 
received certain due process protections, in essence, representation by 
counsel and a jury trial, or the right to waive such a trial, if entitled to 
one.45 The due process requirement was added to the amendment as a 
result of a compromise between Senator Lautenberg and opponents of 
the strong gun ban, providing the opponents with reassurance that 
citizens would not lose their right to possess a gun without a fair trial.46 
Senator Lautenberg opined that the due process requirement would have 
no substantive effect on the statute.47 Although the statute appears to be 
a straightforward, easily applicable law that protects the victims of 
domestic violence, the numerous qualifications and requirements severely 
limit its reach and applicability. 
The Lautenberg Amendment, with its many drawbacks, does 
include some noteworthy differences that make it superior to other 
provisions. Unlike previous amendments to the Gun Control Act, this 
firearm prohibition is permanent, and there is no “official-use” exception, 
thereby abrogating the exemption of law enforcement officers, military 
personnel, and other government employees who use weapons in their 
official capacities.48 While these are significant steps in the right direction, 
the actual implementation of the Lautenberg Amendment is dependent, 
to its detriment, on the actions of law enforcement, prosecutors, and 
judges, as well as the public at large, such as gun dealers and other third 
parties who might transfer firearms to offenders. 
The amendments to the Gun Control Act signified the growing 
recognition of the existence of domestic violence, but there are still 
aspects of the amendments that need clarification. In a recent decision, 
the Supreme Court provided some guidance as to the interpretation of 
the Lautenberg Amendment’s statutory requirements.49 
C. UNITED STATES V. CASTLEMAN 
Many courts have wrestled with the question of what exactly 
constitutes a predicate crime of domestic violence sufficient to trigger the 
federal firearm ban.50 A central issue in this debate is the amount of force 
needed to fulfill the element of “physical force” required under the 
 
 45. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2015). 
 46. See 142 Cong. Rec. S11877 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). 
 47. Id. (“And so this language really does not change anything.”). 
 48. Sack, supra note 31, at 4, 23 n.17 (“In some limited circumstances the firearm ban may be 
lifted, such as when the conviction is ‘expunged or set aside’ or the defendant has been pardoned for 
the offense or has had his civil rights restored.”). 
 49. See United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014).  
 50. Id. at 1410 (discussing the “split of authority among the Courts of Appeals”). 
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Lautenberg Amendment.51 In 2014, in United States v. Castleman, the 
Supreme Court definitively held that even “minor uses of force” such as 
“pushing, grabbing, shoving, slapping, and hitting” constitute the 
requisite predicate crime of domestic violence.52 In light of the states’ 
confusion surrounding qualifying misdemeanor offenses, this decision 
made it clear to state agencies that the Lautenberg Amendment was 
created to meaningfully expand the reach of the firearm prohibitions. 
In 2001, James Castleman pled guilty to “‘intentionally or knowingly 
caus[ing] bodily injury’ to the mother of his child,” a misdemeanor 
offense in Tennessee.53 Seven years later, Castleman was indicted for 
violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) because he was selling firearms on the 
black market after being convicted of an MCDV.54 Castleman filed a 
motion to dismiss, arguing that his 2001 domestic violence conviction 
lacked the requisite element of “physical force” that would render it a 
qualifying MCDV.55 He argued, and the district court agreed, that the 
Tennessee statute under which Castleman was originally convicted did 
not require “violent contact” with the victim.56 The Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court decision, but on different 
grounds.57 That court held that Castleman’s conviction did not trigger the 
Lautenberg Amendment because the force necessary to be a predicate 
crime of domestic violence had to be “violent force,” as defined by 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i), and his offense lacked the requisite degree of violence.58 In 
 
 51. United States v. Castleman, 695 F. 3d 582, 588–89 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) 
(holding that the necessary force is “violent force”); cf. United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 16–17 (1st 
Cir. 2001) (holding that “all types of physical force, regardless of whether they could reasonably be 
expected to cause bodily injury” fulfill the physical force requirement); see also Melanie C. Schneider, 
The Imprecise Draftsmanship of the Lautenberg Amendment and the Resulting Problems for the 
Judiciary, 17 Colum. J. Gender & L. 505, 519–35 (2008) (explaining the differing judicial views of the 
interpretation of “the use of physical force”). 
 52. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1412 (“Minor uses of force may not constitute ‘violence’ in the 
generic sense . . . [b]ut an act of this nature is easy to describe as ‘domestic violence,’ when the 
accumulation of such acts over time can subject one intimate partner to the other’s control . . . 
[therefore], it does not offend common sense . . . to characterize the resulting conviction as a 
‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.’”). 
 53. Id. at 1409.  
 54. See id.  
 55. See id. at 1406–07. 
 56. See id. 
 57. United States v. Castleman, 695 F. 3d 582, 583 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014). 
 58. Id. at 587 (discussing the definition of a “violent felony” and its requisite “violent force”). 
Castleman was convicted under Tennessee Code section 39-13-111(b), which criminalizes the infliction 
of bodily injury, regardless of whether violent force was used. Castleman’s indictment did not indicate 
the amount of force he used, so the Sixth Circuit would not hold that he used violent force. Bethany A. 
Corbin, Goodbye Earl: Domestic Abusers and Guns in the Wake of United States v. Castleman—Can 
the Supreme Court Save Domestic Violence Victims?, 94 Neb. L. Rev. 101, 131 (2015). 
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fact, the issue of whether “physical force” had to be “violent force” had 
troubled numerous federal courts and led to a split of authority.59 
The Supreme Court ruled on this split of authority, disagreeing with 
the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of “use of physical force.”60 It held that 
the common law meaning of “force” is “offensive touching,” and thus 
only a lower level of force was required to satisfy the statutory “use of 
force” element.61 In recognizing that batterers are often charged under 
general assault or battery statutes, the Court acknowledged that this 
common law meaning of “force” is the most applicable.62 The Court also 
pointed to the intent of Congress to explain the holding, finding that 
Congress must have intended to utilize the “offensive touching” 
definition of force because otherwise § 922(g)(9) would not have applied 
in at least ten states.63 More often than not, when the statute was enacted, 
domestic offenders were charged pursuant to general state assault and 
battery laws that fell into two categories: “those that prohibit[ed] both 
offensive touching and the causation of bodily injury, and those that 
prohibit[ed] only the latter.”64 Mere “offensive touching” does not 
inescapably involve the use of violent force, of course.65 Thus, in at least 
ten states that required the causation of bodily injury, § 922(g)(9) would 
have been ineffectual if violent force was required to trigger the statute.66 
The important result of this landmark decision is that offenders 
convicted of MCDVs that involve lesser forms of violence, that is 
“offensive touching,” are clearly subject to the federal firearm prohibition.67 
Although heralded as a significant victory for domestic violence 
advocates, Castleman only expands the number of perpetrators that are 
covered by federal laws. The case does not address the extensive issues, 
such as the lack of relinquishment protocols, which prevent the federal 
laws from actually removing firearms from offenders’ hands. Shortly 
after deciding Castleman, the Supreme Court decided a case regarding 
 
 59. See, e.g., United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 18 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding § 922(g)(9) 
“encompass[es] crimes characterized by the application of any physical force”); cf. United States v. 
Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding § 922(g)(9) covers only “the violent use of force”). 
 60. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1409–10. 
 61. Id. at 1410–11 (discussing both the common law meaning of force and distinguishing it from 
the required use of violent force necessary to satisfy the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) 
definition of a “violent felony”). 
 62. Id. at 1410. 
 63. See id. at 1413. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Lynn Rosenthal, Supreme Court Decision in U.S. v. Castleman Will Save Women’s Lives, 
White House Blog (Mar. 28, 2014, 2:23 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/03/28/supreme-court- 
decision-us-v-castleman-will-save-womens-lives (explaining that some courts did not consider “offensive 
touching” to be a crime of domestic violence, and therefore, did not require defendants to relinquish 
their guns). 
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offenders’ access to firearms that was viewed as a significant loss in the 
eyes of domestic violence advocates.68 
D. HENDERSON V. UNITED STATES 
In May 2015, the Supreme Court issued the Henderson v. United 
States opinion.69 Although not specifically about domestic violence 
offenders, the Henderson ruling applies to all persons subject to § 922(g), 
including domestic violence offenders. The case involved a U.S. Border 
Patrol agent, Tony Henderson, who was charged with felony distribution 
of marijuana.70 As a federal agent, Henderson was required to relinquish 
all of his firearms to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) in 
order to be released on bail, and he complied.71 Shortly thereafter, he 
pled guilty to the felony, triggering § 922(g), which precluded him from 
repossessing his guns.72 Upon release from prison, Henderson contacted 
the FBI to request that they transfer his firearms to his friend.73 The FBI 
denied his request, citing § 922(g) and telling Henderson the transfer 
would amount to “constructive possession,” which is prohibited under 
§ 922(g).74 The district court and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed the FBI’s decision on the grounds that the transfer 
would indeed give Henderson “constructive possession” of the firearm.75 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to resolve [the] circuit split over 
whether, as the courts below held, § 922(g) categorically prohibits a court 
from approving a convicted felon’s request to transfer his firearms to 
another person.”76 
The Court reversed the decision of the lower courts.77 It reasoned, 
“§ 922(g) does not prohibit a felon from owning firearms. Rather, it 
interferes with a single incident of ownership . . . by preventing the felon 
from knowingly possessing his (or another person’s) guns.”78 So, in 
Henderson’s case, he may well have a property right over a firearm, but 
he cannot have the firearm on his person or in his dwelling. The Court 
further explained that this preclusion includes both actual and 
 
 68. See Henderson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1780 (2015). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1783. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. Prohibition of “possession” of a firearm under § 922(g) includes the prohibition of 
“constructive possession.” See Nat’l Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 67 (1914) (explaining that 
the word “possession . . . interchangeably . . . describe[s]” both actual and constructive possession). 
 75. Henderson, 135 S. Ct. at 1783. 
 76. Id. at 1784. 
 77. Id. at 1783. 
 78. Id. at 1784. 
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constructive possession.79 Thus, § 922(g) does not allow a felon’s firearms 
to be transferred to a third party who would give the felon access to the 
firearms at a later date.80 Nonetheless, the Court discussed that the 
transfer to a third party of a felon’s choice “serves only to divest the felon 
of his firearms—and even that much depends on a court’s approving the 
designee’s fitness and ordering the transfer to go forward.”81 This, the 
Court held, is not a possessory interest, and holding otherwise would 
“extend § 922(g)’s scope far beyond its purpose.”82 Thus, § 922(g) does 
not bar a felon from, with a court’s approval, transferring her lawfully 
owned firearms to a third party.83 
Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that some transferees might 
not be trustworthy.84 In such cases, it urged to courts generally 
responsible for ensuring compliance with gun relinquishment laws to 
deny the felon’s request for transfer.85 However, the concern that friends 
or family members of domestic violence offenders can take possession of 
a firearm, only to return it to the offender, is pertinent and should not be 
lightly brushed off. With oversized caseloads and the potential lack of 
familiarity with an individual defendant, judges might not be able to 
easily assess a transferee’s credibility. As the only assurance provided by 
the Court, the use of judiciaries to screen a transferee’s credibility does 
not provide the protection that § 922(g) is seeking. Henderson provides 
domestic violence offenders with a great deal of latitude and will 
undoubtedly put guns back into the hands of some prohibited persons. 
However, even though Henderson undermined the current legislation, 
members of Congress continue to push for legislation to protect victims. 
The most recent effort is the introduction of the Zero Tolerance for 
Domestic Abusers Act. 
E. Zero Tolerance for Domestic Abusers Act 
In July 2015, Congresswoman Debbie Dingell and Congressman 
Robert Dold publicly recognized some of the issues in the current federal 
relinquishment laws, such as the exclusion of dating partners and stalkers 
from the statutory language.86 In response to the shortcomings, they 
 
 79. Id. (“Actual possession exists when a person has direct physical control over a thing . . . . 
Constructive possession is established when a person, though lacking such physical custody, still has 
the power and intent to exercise control over the object.”). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1785. 
 82. Id. at 1786. 
 83. Id. at 1786–87. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 1787. 
 86. Gabby Giffords, National Domestic Violence Prevention Leaders Applaud New House 
Legislation to Keep Guns Out of the Hands of Abusers, Ams. Responsible for Solutions (July 22, 
2015), http://americansforresponsiblesolutions.org/2015/07/22/dv/. 
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introduced the Zero Tolerance for Domestic Abusers Act.87 If passed, 
the act would accomplish two goals toward improved relinquishment 
efforts. First, it would expand the definition of “intimate partner” to 
include former and current dating partners.88 In today’s society, where 
more couples are unmarried or do not live together, this would close a 
considerable gap in the legislation’s reach. Second, the act would prohibit 
stalking misdemeanants from possessing or purchasing firearms.89 This 
portion of the proposed act is a reflection of the greater awareness of the 
dangers of stalkers and would be a substantial addition to the current 
federal laws.90 However, only time will tell whether this act will pass.91 
With an understanding of the federal laws currently in place and the case 
law surrounding them, it is important to now discuss their deficiencies. 
F. Criticisms of Federal Firearms Laws 
The federal firearms prohibition laws, especially when coupled with 
the Castleman holding, seemingly provide domestic violence victims with 
enhanced protection from batterers. These laws were implemented to 
give law enforcement greater authority to keep guns out of the hands of 
all batterers, no matter how “minor” their crimes might seem. However, 
in practice, these laws are rarely enforced. This Part will consider the 
deficiencies of the federal laws, from statutory shortcomings to the roles 
of several major players that make enforcement difficult—if not 
impossible. 
1. Statutory Shortcomings 
A central component that explains the lack of enforcement is the 
failure of the federal laws to provide the states with effective guidelines 
on how to enforce the gun relinquishment provisions.92 The federal laws 
make it a crime to possess, acquire, or sell firearms while subject to a 
domestic violence restraining order or, alternatively, after being convicted of 
an MCDV.93 However, these same laws fail to specify procedures to compel 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Intimate Partner Stalking: Comparing Abusive Partners Who Do and Do Not Stalk, Nat’l 
Inst. of Just. (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/intimate-partner-violence/stalking/pages/ 
stalkers-nonstalkers.aspx (“Stalking was highly prevalent in cases of actual or attempted femicides. 
Approximately 90 percent of actual or attempted lethality victims who experienced a physical assault 
in the preceding year were also stalked by the violent partner.”). 
 91. Currently, the Act has been introduced in the House and has been referred out to the 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations. H.R. 3130—Zero 
Tolerance for Domestic Abusers Act, Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/ 
house-bill/3130/actions (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
 92. Sack, supra note 31, at 7. 
 93. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8)–(9) (2015). 
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abusers to surrender their firearms, leaving states with the formidable 
process of creating their own protocols. 
The chances of relinquishment are further hindered by the reality 
that federal prosecutors are oftentimes unaware of violations of the 
federal law because the predicate offenses—namely the domestic 
violence restraining order and the MCDV—are generally cases heard in 
state court.94 Although in the digital era state information on restraining 
orders and crimes is transmitted to federal authorities electronically by a 
law enforcement telecommunications system, many states do not reliably 
enter domestic violence misdemeanors or restraining orders into the 
correct databases.95 This is oftentimes a symptom of the disjunctive 
nature of many crimes that could qualify as an MCDV.96 For example, an 
assault statute might criminalize the use of physical force or the use of 
verbal threats. If the requisite domestic relationship is present, then a 
perpetrator could be convicted of an MCDV under the first prong 
(physical force), but not under the second prong (verbal threats).97 
Without a clear indication of the relationship between the victim and 
perpetrator and the specific prong implicated in the crime within the 
electronic record, these types of convictions can easily go unnoticed by 
firearm distributors, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers. In other 
words, one of these players could mistakenly believe that there is no 
requisite MCDV because the electronic system does not provide enough 
information about the underlying crime. In effect, the absence of 
instruction and specific requirements in the federal laws regarding gun 
relinquishment procedures leaves state court judges and local law 
enforcement unwilling and unable to reliably collect guns from those 
offenders subject to the gun relinquishment laws. 
Another obstacle in this context is that the federal gun 
relinquishment laws do not provide incentives for states to enforce the 
federal laws.98 Incentives, especially in light of the current financial status 
of many states, could be the determining factor in whether a state opts to 
enforce or implement the respective statute or procedure. In order to 
receive certain funding,99 the Violence Against Women and Department 
of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 required states and local 
 
 94. Sack, supra note 31, at 7–8 (explaining that predicate offenses are most often issues of state law). 
 95. Domestic Violence and Firearms Policy Summary, supra note 22; see also U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Information Needed to Enforce the Firearm Prohibition: Misdemeanor Crimes of 
Domestic Violence (2007) (providing a discussion of the complicated legal issues that arise in state 
reporting of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, including disjunctive statutes that require a 
sophisticated and accurate reporting system). 
 96. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 95. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Melanie L. Mecka, Note, Seizing the Ammunition from Domestic Violence: Prohibiting the 
Ownership of Firearms by Abusers, 29 Rutgers L.J. 607, 634 (1998). 
 99. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg-4 (2015) (providing funding for rape examinations). 
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governments to certify that their judicial policies included notification to 
domestic violence offenders of the federal, state, and local firearm 
prohibitions.100 However, the act did not require the establishment of 
procedures for the relinquishment of the firearms as a prerequisite for 
funding. Implementing gun relinquishment protocols is an expensive 
process,101 and the federal government has not provided states with any 
funding to enforce the federal gun relinquishment laws.102  
In an attempt to address this problem, two bills have been 
introduced in Congress. The first, entitled the Domestic Violence Criminal 
Disarmament Act of 2013, was introduced in the House of Representatives 
in November 2013.103 This bill sought to amend the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 in order to provide grant money to 
states that enacted laws and procedures to seize and force surrender of 
firearms from those subject to the federal gun relinquishment laws.104 
Unfortunately, the bill soon died in committee.105 The Senate introduced 
the second bill, the Domestic Violence Gun Homicide Prevention Act of 
2014, in July 2014.106 It adopted a parallel approach to the previous bill by 
creating grants for states that (1) implemented laws mirroring the federal 
relinquishment laws, and (2) took significant steps to retrieve guns from 
domestic violence offenders.107 Again, this bill died quickly after it was 
introduced.108 These unsuccessful legislative efforts signify that even 
when federal legislators attempt to remedy the lack of funding for state 
agencies, they cannot surmount even initial hurdles of statutory 
enhancement, thereby allowing the problematic status quo to reign. 
The federal firearm prohibition laws exist, in part, to create a safer 
community for victims of domestic violence by preventing offenders from 
accessing firearms. However, the statutes themselves have failed to 
produce the desired results. These statutory deficiencies must be addressed 
in order to strengthen relinquishment efforts, but to date, Congress has 
 
 100. See, e.g., id. 
 101. For example, effective gun relinquishment protocols would likely require the formation of 
working groups to develop and oversee the protocol implementation, increase communication 
amongst the various entities responsible for implementation, and implement training for these entities. 
 102. See, e.g., Domestic Violence Practice & Procedure Task Force, Domestic Violence: Final 
Report of the Domestic Violence Practice Procedure Task Force 18 (Jan. 16, 2008), 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/dvpp_judicialcouncilreport.pdf (providing that even the cost of a 
task force to look into the implantation of a gun relinquishment program will require a great deal of 
resources); Mecka, supra note 98, at 634. 
 103. H.R. 3566, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
 104. Id. 
 105. H.R. 3566 (113th): Domestic Violence Criminal Disarmament Act of 2013, Govtrack.us, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr3566 (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
 106. S. 2676, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014). 
 107. Id. 
 108. S. 2676 (113th): Domestic Violence Gun Homicide Prevention Act of 2014, Govtrack.us, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s2676 (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
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failed to remedy these issues. Yet, the statutes are not the only issues 
reducing the success of the federal laws. 
2. Role of Background Checks 
Background checks pose another problem for the enforcement of 
the federal firearm prohibition laws. They are the only systems that alert 
gun dealers to a prospective buyer’s eligibility for gun ownership, making 
them immensely important. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention 
Act of 1993 authorized the creation of the National Instant Criminal 
Background Check System (“NICS”),109 which only applies to licensed 
gun dealers.110 Pursuant to the Act, a licensed gun dealer must check a 
photo ID and receive a completed basic information form from the 
potential purchaser before selling a gun.111 The gun dealer is required to 
conduct a background check using the NICS and cannot sell firearms to 
individuals who are prohibited from buying or possessing guns.112 Unless 
there is a delay, indicating a possible match with a prohibitory record, 
most background checks can be completed within thirty seconds.113 If 
NICS reports that the sale is permitted, then the dealer may complete the 
sale of the firearm.114 The dealer may not complete the sale if NICS 
reports that the sale is denied.115 Authorities have three business days to 
conduct a more thorough background check and report back to the 
dealer if there is a delay.116 If three days pass and the dealer has not yet 
heard back regarding the prospective buyer, the dealer has the discretion 
to decide whether to sell the firearm to the buyer if state laws allow it.117 
The integrity of the federal gun laws relies on the background check 
system to keep firearms out of the hands of prohibited persons, but there 
are several issues that prevent the system from fully succeeding. 
The NICS fails on several levels, starting with the actual information 
that is supplied to the system. In order for the NICS to be as effective as 
possible, it must contain accurate and up-to-date data, but in its current 
 
 109. National Instant Criminal Background Check System, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
 110. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) 
(requiring only licensed importers, licensed manufacturers, or licensed dealers to participate in 
background check system). 
 111. Everytown for Gun Safety, Guns and Violence Against Women: America’s Uniquely 
Lethal Domestic Violence Problem 6 (June 18, 2014). 
 112. Id. 
 113. National Instant Criminal Background Check System: Fact Sheet, Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/general-information/fact-sheet (last visited Apr. 
10, 2016). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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form, it contains neither.118 Many states do not voluntarily report the 
necessary information, including criminal history records, mental health 
records, and drug abuse records, to background check systems because 
there is no punishment for failure to do so.119 As a result, hundreds of 
thousands of records have not been entered into the NICS.120 Aside from 
no requirement to report, states are having a difficult time identifying the 
perpetrators who should be prohibited from possessing firearms.121 This is 
likely in part a result of the federal government’s failure to provide states 
with sufficient instruction as to what exactly qualifies as an MCDV, as 
discussed above. Furthermore, a large percentage of domestic violence 
restraining orders are never even entered into the NICS for varying and 
unknown reasons.122 Due to privacy laws, a state’s failure to enter data 
into the NICS creates a massive problem in light of the fact that the FBI 
does not have access to this information.123 With such large gaps in the 
system’s information, it is not feasible for gun dealers to accurately assess 
each sale and prevent the sale of firearms to designated persons using the 
NICS. The inadequacies of the NICS loom large over licensed firearm 
dealers, but there exists another category of dealers who are not required 
to consider the NICS: the unlicensed dealers, discussed below. 
Although the NICS has effectively prevented the purchase of over 
2.4 million guns since its inception in 1998,124 there are glaring 
deficiencies in federal gun laws that thwart the success of the NICS.125 
Notably, the federal law requiring background checks for the sale of guns 
 
 118. Background Checks, Everytown for Gun Safety, http://everytown.org/issue/background-
checks/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2016) (discussing the failure of federal and state agencies to send records 
to the national background check databases). 
 119. See Background Check Procedures Policy Summary, Law Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence 
(July 13, 2015), http://smartgunlaws.org/background-check-procedures-policy-summary/; see also 28 
C.F.R. § 25.4 (2013). According to case law, a federal statute requiring states to disclose records to the 
FBI would violate of the Tenth Amendment. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding 
that temporary Brady Act provisions obligating local law enforcement officers to conduct background 
checks on prospective handgun purchasers was unconstitutional). 
 120. Background Check Procedures Policy Summary, supra note 120.  
 121. See supra Part I.F.1; Sack, supra note 31, at 8. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 
95 (providing an overview of the criteria of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence and why it can 
be difficult to enforce the gun prohibition). 
 122. Devon Spurgeon, 450 Restraining Orders Not Logged into System, Baltimore Police Say, Balt. Sun 
(Nov. 20, 1999), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1999-11-20/news/9911200315_1_restraining-state-police- 
orders (explaining that almost twelve percent of domestic violence restraining orders in Baltimore 
were not entered into the background check system). 
 123. See Background Check Procedures Policy Summary, supra note 119. The FBI is generally 
responsible for running the background checks. However, some states choose to use designated Points 
of Contact (“POCs”) to run the checks. National Instant Criminal Background Check System Fact 
Sheet, supra note 113. 
 124. Alex Yablon, The 12 Reasons Why Americans Fail Federal Gun Background Checks, Trace 
(July 31, 2015), http://www.thetrace.org/2015/07/gun-background-checks-nics-failure/. 
 125. Every Town for Gun Safety, supra note 111, at 5–6 (discussing that hundreds of thousands 
of domestic violence perpetrators have been stopped from purchasing guns from licensed dealers). 
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only applies to licensed dealers.126 As a result, domestic violence 
perpetrators are still free to purchase guns, without the threat of a 
background check, from unlicensed dealers online or at gun shows.127 
They do so in large numbers and with impunity.128 When unlicensed 
dealers do not know a purchaser is prohibited, they act completely within 
their legal rights when they sell guns to abusers.129 This loophole threatens 
the entire relinquishment process because even if states manage to 
develop strong relinquishment protocols, a domestic violence perpetrator 
can still purchase a weapon minutes after surrendering all of his firearms 
to law enforcement or a vetted third party. 
If the background check system is ineffective and not required, then 
it makes the relinquishment of firearms a futile process. Offenders are 
aware of the system’s loopholes and failures. Even if they feel compelled 
to surrender their firearms, they have a relatively easy way to evade the 
restrictions and acquire a new weapon. Not only does the legislature 
need to mandate use of background checks for all dealers—licensed and 
unlicensed—but the system also needs to be current and user friendly.130 
However, it will only be as good as the persons utilizing the information, 
which is where the police come into play. 
3. Role of Police 
The role of police in the enforcement of the gun relinquishment 
provisions is central to the utility of these provisions. After the 
relinquishment laws are triggered, law enforcement officers are 
responsible for the seizure or forfeiture of the firearms, a task that 
oftentimes proves to be time intensive and expensive. These laws are only 
operative if law enforcement officers enforce them. However, police 
attitudes hamper enforcement efforts because the federal gun 
relinquishment laws must be enforced by state and local law enforcement 
agencies, causing some local police to perceive the laws as an infringement 
on their power.131 Some local law enforcement officers have argued that 
they should not be using their limited resources to enforce federal laws.132 
Instead, they believe that their funding should go toward enforcing their 
 
 126. Id. at 8. 
 127. Id. (providing examples of incidents where domestic abusers have purchased guns without 
background check only to murder their former partners). 
 128. Id. (citing 2013 study conducted by Mayors Against Illegal Guns that found one in thirty 
prospective online gun buyers were prohibited buyers, and one in four of those prohibited buyers had 
been arrested for domestic violence). 
 129. Id. However, in the sixteen states that “go beyond federal law and require background checks 
for all handgun sales . . . 38 percent fewer women are shot to death by intimate partners.” Id. at 9. 
 130. See infra Part III.C. 
 131. Sack, supra note 31, at 9. 
 132. Mecka, supra note 98, at 643–45 (discussing Utah’s refusal to adopt the federal laws). 
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respective state relinquishment laws (if they even exist).133 Moreover, 
local law enforcement might feel a particular disdain for the Lautenberg 
Amendment as it purposefully removed the ability of law enforcement 
officers to be exempt from its reach.134 Some have gone as far as to 
condemn the Lautenberg Amendment, including the former National 
Vice President of the Fraternal Order of Police, Bernard H. Teodorski, 
who called the Act “ill-crafted” and “ill-conceived.”135 Police attitudes 
are only one contributing factor to the lack of enforcement. There are 
also systemic defects preventing law enforcement officers from fully 
cooperating with relinquishment efforts. 
As discussed in Part I.F.2, much of the success of the gun 
relinquishment laws relies on the use of the NICS. Police play an 
important role in the execution of the NICS, as they are the enforcement 
mechanism that powers the system. Law enforcement officers have three 
days to execute a background check for a gun buyer before the buyer is 
approved by default.136 In light of the issues with the NICS described 
above (such as containing incomplete and inaccurate information), three 
days is an insufficient amount of time to conduct these checks. 
Accordingly, if the police are unable or unwilling to perform their role, 
then the system cannot operate effectively. 
Even the most stringent and thorough laws would be moot without 
enforcement by police officers. The background check system, as it 
currently stands, does not provide officers with the necessary information 
to prohibit firearm sales to designated persons. Further, officers are 
unable to reliably determine if firearms must be seized from offenders 
without a complete background check system. The officers’ failure to 
keep guns out of offenders’ hands subjects domestic violence victims to 
preventable and foreseeable harms, as evidenced by the murder of 
Nicolette Elias.137 But before officers are involved, prosecutors must 
charge and convict domestic violence offenders to place them on the 
prohibited persons list. 
4. Role of Prosecutors 
Violations of the federal firearm prohibition laws are federal crimes. 
As such, it is the responsibility of federal prosecutors to charge and 
convict those who violate §§ 922(g)(8) and (9). Unfortunately, the reality 
that federal prosecutors rarely charge cases under these sections is an 
 
 133. Id. at 644 (citing Illinois as an example of a state that has created its own laws regarding 
domestic violence offenders and firearm prohibitions). 
 134. Sack, supra note 31, at 8. 
 135. Domestic Violence Offender Gun Ban: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 
(1997) (statement of Bernard H. Teodorski). 
 136. 18 U.S.C. § 922(t) (2015). 
 137. See supra Introduction. 
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indication that they are not pursuing these cases diligently.138 
Prosecutions under §§ 922(g)(8) and (9) only add up to approximately 
three percent of the total prosecutions under § 922(g) as a whole.139 The 
lack of prosecutions cannot be ascribed to a low number of possible 
defendants.140 So why is this the case? 
There are several probable reasons for this low rate of prosecutions, 
including the structure of the U.S. Attorneys’ offices, a lack of resources, 
and a lack of sentencing guidelines. First, the structure of the U.S. 
Attorneys’ offices can be detrimental to the prosecution of domestic 
violence crimes because many prosecution units do not inherently cover 
these crimes.141 For example, the U.S. Attorney’s office in Wisconsin has 
a Criminal Litigation Unit that is broken down into the following 
subunits: Direct Prosecution,142 Special Prosecutions,143 Sexual Predator 
Commitments,144 Advice and Consultation,145 and Prosecutor and Law 
 
 138. Tom Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers, 54 Hastings L.J. 525, 531–32 (2003) (“[T]he 
ninety-four U.S. Attorneys’ offices have failed to generate an annual average of one case per district 
since section 922(g)(8) was enacted in 1994. . . . [P]rosecutions under section 922(g)(9) make up just 
two to three percent of the total prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) . . . .”). 
 139. Lininger, supra note 138, at 530–32. Section 922(g) prohibits the following persons from 
possessing a firearm: felons, fugitives, drug addicts, mentally ill, illegal immigrants, those who have 
been dishonorably discharged from the Armed Forces, those who have renounced their American 
citizenship, those subject to a domestic violence restraining order, and domestic violence 
misdemeanants. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 
 140. Lininger, supra note 138, at 531.  
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) was enacted in 1994 and the number of prosecutions for violating has 
been minuscule (perhaps fewer than 10, though I have not been able to discover the exact 
number, which is not a reported statistic) in relation to the probable number of violations. I 
estimate that every year the law has been in effect almost one hundred thousand restraining 
orders against domestic violence have been issued. Since 40 percent of U.S. households own 
guns, there can be very little doubt that a large percentage of those orders were issued 
against gun owners. 
United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 294 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 141. Sack, supra note 31, at 8. 
 142. Criminal Litigation Unit, Wis. Dep’t of Justice, https://www.doj.state.wi.us/dls/criminal-
litigation-unit (last visited Apr. 10, 2016) (“The unit has authority to initiate criminal prosecutions for 
violations of selected statutes including securities, tax, and the Wisconsin Organized Crime Control 
Act.”). 
 143. Id. (“At the request of district attorneys, unit members investigate and act as special 
prosecutors throughout Wisconsin in homicide, white-collar crime, public corruption, election fraud, 
multi-jurisdictional criminal cases, and other cases where the district attorney needs assistance or is 
unable to act.”). 
 144. Id. (“The unit has a primary role in prosecuting sexual predator commitments in counties 
across the state and also handles post-commitment proceedings in those cases.”). 
 145. Id. (“The unit provides advice and assistance to law enforcement and prosecutors on a variety 
of issues including specialized areas such as Internet Crimes Against Children, elder abuse, child abuse 
and neglect, and computer crimes. Unit attorneys also review and comment on criminal related 
legislation.”). 
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Enforcement Training.146 None of these sub-units specializes in domestic 
violence related prosecutions, and domestic violence related prosecutions 
do not fall squarely within any of their purviews. Furthermore, the culture 
of these offices disfavors the prosecution of domestic violence crimes 
because this would require federal prosecutors to rely too heavily upon 
state convictions in their own work.147 Federal prosecutions that depend 
on state-level prosecutions are not as highly regarded as white-collar 
criminal prosecutions.148 A noticeably low level of coordination and 
communication between federal prosecutors and local law enforcement 
further exacerbates the challenge of reliance on state convictions.149 
Moreover, some U.S. Attorneys’ offices fail to prosecute under the 
respective federal firearm prohibitions due to a lack of resources, 
especially a lack of funds.150 Many federal prosecutors will pass up 
opportunities to charge these crimes because §§ 922(g)(8) and (9), unlike 
the other federal gun laws, come with low sentences.151 The tendency is to 
encourage these prosecutors to attain higher sentences than those that 
can be acquired by their state counterparts.152 Knowing that these 
offenders will likely get much lower prison sentences, federal prosecutors 
do not feel the need to aggressively pursue federal firearm possession 
cases.153 With such a low probability of being charged with these crimes, 
domestic violence offenders might see no need to relinquish their 
firearms. In their minds, then, the price of nonrelinquishment is not high 
enough to convince them to actually surrender their firearms. However, 
this might not be the case if judges, who have face-to-face contact with 
offenders, are insistent upon educating offenders about their 
relinquishment duties. In addition to their ability to communicate directly 
with offenders, judges impact the implementation of relinquishment 
protocols in several ways. 
 
 146. Id. (“Attorneys from the unit provide general advice, training and education to prosecutors 
and law enforcement through a variety of means including its Statewide Prosecutors Education and 
Training (SPET) program.”). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Maria Kelly, Domestic Violence and Guns: Seizing Weapons Before the Court Has Made a 
Finding of Abuse, 23 Vt. L. Rev. 349, 364 (1998) (discussing the example of the Vermont U.S. 
Attorney’s Office as unable to prosecute due to “limited resources”). 
 151. Lininger, supra note 138, at 596 (noting that prosecutions under §§ 922(g)(8) and (9) yield an 
average two-year sentence, while the average federal firearm prosecution yields an eight-year 
sentence). 
 152. Id. at 597. 
 153. Id. 
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5. Role of Judges 
As gatekeepers to the issuance of domestic violence restraining 
orders or MCDV convictions, judges also play a role in the enforcement 
of the gun relinquishment laws. Although the most pertinent goal of the 
federal firearms laws is to protect domestic violence victims, “judges 
have long invented ways to protect batterers, including the application of 
judge-made laws to domestic violence occurrences.”154 Due to personal 
biases, some judges may refuse to find that a perpetrator committed 
domestic violence by excluding evidence or “wholly ignor[ing] admitted 
evidence,” thereby avoiding the issuance of a restraining order or a 
misdemeanor conviction.155 There are a number of reasons for this type 
of judicial behavior. For example, some judges might have sympathy for 
offenders because they are police officers or have served in the 
military.156 Others might exhibit biases against victims of domestic 
violence.157 Judges, reflexively guided by their personal belief systems, 
have a significant effect on the outcomes of relinquishment protocols. 
The federal laws are in place to protect the victims of domestic violence 
and should not be subject to the whim of a judge on any particular day. 
Nonetheless, the judicial system in this nation is set up such that judges 
have a great deal of discretion. There are instances where the legislature 
has sought to reduce the discretion of judges, such as through the 
implementation of sentencing guidelines. However, many people, 
including judges, have very strong opinions about domestic violence, and 
it seems improbable to believe that one can completely omit the personal 
beliefs of judges from the implementation of §§ 922(g)(8) and (9). 
Although empirical data is lacking on these judicial practices, 
anecdotal evidence is available. One egregious, but not uncommon, 
example of a judge abusing discretion and allowing a domestic violence 
perpetrator to sidestep the federal gun bans took place in rural 
Missouri.158 A judge, who believed a young wife’s testimony regarding the 
severe abuse that she endured at the hands of her husband and heard the 
husband confess to his actions, nevertheless denied the issuance of a 
restraining order.159 Instead, the judge told the wife to increase her safety 
 
 154. Lisa D. May, The Backfiring of the Domestic Violence Firearms Bans, 14 Colum. J. Gender & L. 1, 
23 (2005). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See, e.g., Freeman v. Freeman, 169 Wash. 2d 664, 676 (2010) (citing an offender’s war injury 
and amputation as a reason to terminate a permanent restraining order). 
 157. Joan Zorza, Battered Mothers Speak out About Court Injustices, 8 Domestic Violence Rep. 
33, 34, 44 (2003). 
 158. May, supra note 154, at 2. 
 159. Id. at 1–2 (“A severely battered woman . . . described her husband throwing her to the 
ground, threatening her with death, and waking her in the middle of the night by holding her down 
and beating her.”). 
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by changing the locks on her door.160 The same day in open court, this 
particular judge explained that the “upcoming quail hunting season” 
served as a reason to avoid the issuance of another restraining order.161 
This remark signals the reality that many victims of domestic violence are 
faced with every day, namely, the belief of many Americans that a person’s 
right to possess a gun supersedes the safety of a victim. By providing 
loopholes, or wholly ignoring a victim’s plight, judges are able to avoid 
the need to seize firearms from offenders. 
Although judges often evade the federal firearm laws, both federal 
and state judges lack the authority to actually strike down the federal 
firearms laws. Even in states that do not have state firearms prohibition 
laws that are as stringent as the federal law, neither statute can supersede 
the other.162 Thus, theoretically, state judges cannot avoid the reach of 
the federal firearms prohibitions. Instead, legal commentators explain: 
[B]oth sets of laws remain in full force and both apply to this situation. 
The respondent would not be subject to a state-law firearm provision, 
because the judge opted not to invoke her authority to prohibit gun 
possession, but the respondent nonetheless would be subject to federal 
prosecution under the federal gun law, because the federal prohibition 
is independent of state law . . . . In fact, section 922(g)(8) does not rely 
upon state law definitions or standards to determine whether a person 
is prohibited from possessing a firearm . . . . [T]his means that the 
particular findings and terms of the order must be assessed against the 
federal requirements . . . . All of this is not to say, however, that the 
actions of state court judges do not profoundly affect the operations of 
federal law. In fact, the nature of the conduct proscribed by the order 
or of the findings of fact included therein determines whether the 
federal law applies.163 
Essentially, judges who believe that they can allow offenders to 
evade the federal law bans (by failing to check certain boxes on a 
restraining order or by writing a note indicating that the federal firearms 
laws do not apply) are misinformed.164 In other words, if a restraining 
order meets the requirements, the federal firearms prohibition will apply 
to the offender because “state court judges do not determine the 
applicability of the federal law.”165 Judges do, however, have the ability to 
control the findings of fact and to determine if the defendant’s conduct 
 
 160. Id. at 2. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Carrie Chew, Domestic Violence, Guns, and Minnesota Women: Responding to New Law, 
Correcting Old Legislative Need, and Taking Cues from Other Jurisdictions, 25 Hamline J. Pub. L. & 
Pol’y 115, 150 (2003). 
 163. Darren Mitchell & Susan B. Carbon, Firearms and Domestic Violence: A Primer for Judges, 
39 Ct. Rev. 32, 38 (2002). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
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qualifies as “prohibited,” which then controls the applicability of the 
federal law.166  
On a practical level, judges are also responsible for the “deterrent 
effect” of the federal firearms laws.167 Judges have the opportunity to 
interact with offenders to notify them of the federal statute.168 As such, 
they are in the unique position of explaining that the prohibited persons 
must surrender their firearms. Without judicial clarification, a domestic 
violence perpetrator subject to a restraining order or convicted of an 
MCDV might not otherwise know of her obligation to relinquish 
firearms. If a perpetrator is unaware of her relinquishment obligation 
and local law enforcement is failing to enforce a relinquishment protocol, 
the effectiveness of the relinquishment laws is undoubtedly diminished. 
While the passage of the federal firearm laws represented immense 
victories for domestic violence victims, survivors, and advocates, the 
actual consistent enforcement of these laws failed to meet expectations. 
One explanation for this failure is the federal government not presenting 
the states with guidelines or incentives to implement the relinquishment 
provisions. Further, the glaring defects in the NICS and the loopholes in 
the background check system allow offenders to easily obtain firearms 
even if they abide by the relinquishment protocols initially. Aside from 
the statutory deficiencies, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and 
judges all play a role in the failed relinquishment system. Each bringing 
their own biases to the table, these players can, and often do, disrupt the 
federal relinquishment laws. With such a large number of issues 
preventing the realization of the federal laws, the only chance for more 
success is the enactment and enforcement of state laws. 
II.  State Relinquishment Laws 
This Part will discuss the enactment, or lack thereof, of state laws 
that support or mimic the federal firearm bans. Without a statutory 
scheme to dictate how to collect firearms from offenders, the federal gun 
relinquishment laws cannot be successfully implemented. Although some 
federal legislators are attempting to enact improved laws, their inability 
to push federal bills through Congress makes the need for state laws even 
greater. Consequently, one must turn to the state relinquishment laws in 
order to determine the value of federal prohibitions. In fact, Lautenberg 
Amendment proponents have argued that the “[federal] laws are an 
attempt to supplement local [and state] law enforcement’s role—not 
supplant it—with the federal government’s ‘traditional role in restricting 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. Chew, supra note 162, at 151. 
 168. Id. 
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the availability of firearms.’”169 However, this statement neglects to 
recognize that many individual states do not see the federal laws as a 
supplementation, especially those states that have no domestic violence 
firearm bans in place. Moreover, these proponents seemingly fail to 
appreciate the financial and procedural burden the federal statutes place 
on individual states. As a result, state laws reflect a range of provisions 
about gun relinquishment, indicating both an indifference to the federal 
laws in states that have not enacted any additional legislation and a 
progressive understanding of the necessity of supplemental state laws in 
states that have mirrored or even gone above and beyond the borders of 
the federal provisions. 
A. Range of State Laws 
Despite the anticipated reliance on more local enforcement, state 
laws in this context profoundly lack strength, comprehensiveness, and 
enforceability. Although federal law mandates relinquishment, in a 
majority of states, state laws do not require domestic violence offenders 
to surrender guns that they already own.170 Only eleven states require 
domestic violence misdemeanants to surrender their guns, and sixteen 
states require subjects of domestic violence restraining orders to do the 
same.171 Fifteen other states and Washington, D.C. only authorize, but do 
not require, courts to issue restraining orders with gun relinquishment 
provisions for some offenders.172 However, in as much as the states have a 
mixture of different language, requirements, and conditions in their 
statutes, they also have some very broad similarities. 
State laws predominantly adopt two approaches regarding the 
enforcement of gun relinquishment provisions.173 The first, and more 
 
 169. Mecka, supra note 98, at 643. 
 170. Every Town for Gun Safety, supra note 111, at 3 (noting that in forty-one states all domestic 
violence offenders are not required to surrender guns that they already own). The actual number is 
now forty states as Delaware enacted a new gun relinquishment law. Domestic Violence and Firearms 
in Delaware, Law Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence (Oct. 19, 2015), http://smartgunlaws.org/domestic-
violence-and-firearms-in-delaware/. 
 171. Every Town for Gun Safety, supra note 111, at 9. These numbers have been altered slightly 
because of new legislation passed by Delaware in 2015. See Domestic Violence and Firearms in 
Delaware, supra note 170. 
 172. Every Town for Gun Safety, supra note 111, at 9. These numbers have been altered slightly 
because of new legislation passed by Delaware and Nevada in 2015. See Domestic Violence and 
Firearms in Delaware, supra note 170; Domestic Violence and Firearms in Nevada, Law Ctr. to 
Prevent Gun Violence (Aug. 14, 2015), http://smartgunlaws.org/domestic-violence-and-firearms-in-
nevada/. For example, “Alaska law provides that restraining orders against ‘household members’ 
(including former and current dating partners) may prohibit the use or possession of firearms if the 
subject of the restraining order possessed a firearm at the time of an incident giving rise to the 
restraining order.” Every Town for Gun Safety, supra note 111, at 14. 
 173. Shannon Frattaroli, John Hopkins Ctr. for Gun Policy & Research, Removing Guns 
from Domestic Violence Offenders: An Analysis of State Level Policies to Prevent Future 
Abuse 4 (2009). 
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effective, approach accords law enforcement the explicit authority to 
remove guns from offenders in response to a domestic violence call.174 
For example, in Tennessee, if law enforcement officers have probable 
cause to believe that a domestic violence offense was committed, all 
firearms that might have been used to harm or threaten the victim must 
be seized.175 Moreover, “[i]ncident to an arrest for a crime involving 
domestic abuse[,] . . . a law enforcement officer may seize a weapon that 
is in plain view . . . or discovered pursuant to a consensual search.”176 The 
states that follow this approach177 employ a wide variety of statutory 
language that alters the implementation results. Some states178 require 
police officers to remove any firearms by using “shall” in the statute’s 
language.179 For example, a Montana statute provides: “A peace officer 
who responds to a call relating to partner or family member assault shall 
seize the weapon used or threatened to be used in the alleged assault.”180 
In comparison, other states181 utilize “may” language in the statutes, 
giving police officers the discretion to seize any weapons.182 In 
Connecticut, for example, a statute provides:  
Whenever a peace officer determines that a family violence crime has 
been committed, such officer may seize any firearm or electronic 
defense weapon . . . or ammunition at the location where the crime is 
alleged to have been committed that is in the possession of any person 
arrested for the commission of such crime or suspected of its commission 
or that is in plain view.183 
Some states require that the firearm be used in the commission of 
the crime before it can be seized.184 Other states require the alleged 
abuser to be arrested before seizure of firearms is allowed.185 Yet other 
states only allow guns to be removed if the responding officers deem it 
necessary to protect the victim or other household members.186 Although 
these states all allow police to remove firearms from domestic violence 
 
 174. Id. at 4, 11–18 (providing examples such as California, Illinois, and Montana). 
 175. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-620(a)(1) (West 2010). 
 176. Id. § 36-3-620(a)(2) (not requiring officers to remove weapons that they deem to be necessary 
for the victim to protect herself). However, if multiple weapons are seized, only the weapon that was 
actually used to harm or threaten a victim may be confiscated, while all others must be returned to the 
offender. Id. § 36-3-620(b). 
 177. Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Nebraska, New 
Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah, and West Virginia are other states that follow this 
approach. Frattaroli, supra note 173, at 6. 
 178. For example, California, Illinois, and Montana. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-6-603 (2015). 
 181. For example, Alaska, Arizona, and Connecticut. Frattaroli, supra note 173, at 6. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-38b(a) (2011). 
 184. Frattaroli, supra note 173, at 7. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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offenders, the different statutory language significantly alters the officers’ 
level of discretion to do so. 
The second grouping of state laws is less far-reaching because its 
application is subject to judicial discretion and limited to the context of 
restraining order proceedings only. This type grants courts the authority 
to order the surrender of a firearm as a provision of a restraining order.187 
For example, in Maryland, upon the issuance of a final restraining order, 
a court “shall order the respondent to surrender to law enforcement 
authorities any firearm in the respondent’s possession, and to refrain 
from possession of any firearm, for the duration of the [restraining] order.”188 
The states that apply this approach also utilize different statutory language 
that results in varying degrees of success of these relinquishment laws. 
Parallel to the first approach, states use “shall” or “may” in the statutes 
to either require removal or allow discretion for removal of firearms 
following the issuance of a restraining order.189 Importantly, these gun 
relinquishment provisions generally apply only to permanent restraining 
orders.190 Many victims fail to obtain permanent restraining orders for 
various reasons that often mimic why victims stay in the relationship,191 
making the statutes less influential. Requiring a permanent restraining 
order narrows the reach of these statutes, when the dangerousness of an 
offender subject to a temporary restraining order can be equal or more 
than an offender subject to a permanent restraining order. However, in 
some states (such as California), the relinquishment provisions also apply 
to ex parte orders.192 This is significant in light of the fact that the federal 
relinquishment laws require notice to the offender in order to trigger the 
provisions.193 The ability to require an offender to surrender his or her 
firearms as a result of an ex parte hearing considerably widens the reach 
of the laws. The states that follow this approach may or may not require 
 
 187. Id. at 19. 
 188. Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 4-506(f) (West 2015). 
 189. Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin are other states that apply this approach. Frattaroli, supra 
note 173, at 19–28 (providing a comprehensive list of each state’s statutory language). 
 190. Id. (noting specific states that require final restraining order rather than temporary restraining 
order). 
 191. Judith A. Wolfer, Top 10 Myths About Domestic Violence, 42 Md. B.J. 38, 40 (2009). Some 
examples of why a domestic violence victim may not obtain a permanent restraining order include: 
(1) the offender threatened her and she was too frightened; (2) the violence escalated and the victim 
was too scared or unable to attend the hearing; (3) the violence decreased and the victim believed the 
offender had changed; and (4) the victim might feel “guilty.” See Compelling Reasons Women Stay, 
Domestic Abuse Project, http://www.domesticabuseproject.com/get-educated/compelling-reasons-
women-stay/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
 192. See Cal. Fam. Code § 6389(c) (West 2015). 
 193. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(A) (2015) (explaining the Lautenberg Amendment applies to those who 
are subject to a domestic violence restraining order that “was issued after a hearing of which such 
person received actual notice.”). 
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the use or perceived use of the firearms to trigger the relinquishment 
protocols.194 The easiest way to understand the effects of the various 
statutory approaches is to examine the spectrum of state statutes, ranging 
from least progressive to most progressive. 
1. Least Progressive: Arkansas 
State firearm relinquishment provisions run the gamut from weak to 
strong. Arkansas law provides an example of one of the least progressive 
approaches to state gun relinquishment. For example, the state does not: 
(1) prohibit domestic violence misdemeanants from purchasing or 
possessing guns; (2) prohibit offenders subject to domestic violence 
restraining orders from purchasing or possessing guns; (3) compel 
domestic violence offenders who are prohibited from possessing guns 
under federal law to relinquish their guns; or (4) make it mandatory for 
courts to notify these domestic abusers when they become subject to 
these prohibitions.195 Moreover, there are no statutes requiring, or even 
authorizing, law enforcement officers to remove firearms from the scenes 
of domestic violence incidents.196 The only relevant statute allows a 
criminal court to prohibit firearm possession as part of a no contact 
order.197 Arkansas lawmakers have not created any state laws to bolster 
or mimic the federal gun relinquishment laws. As a consequence of the 
weak state laws, Arkansas has repeatedly been ranked amongst the 
states with the highest rates of men killing women, indicating a high level 
of domestic violence.198 This is a striking example of how ineffective the 
federal laws can be without the backing of relevant state laws. If states do 
not require their local judiciaries to recognize and reiterate the firearm 
prohibitions, relinquishment efforts are futile. Fortunately, not all states 
follow this approach, and have instead implemented more progressive 
approaches to gun relinquishment. 
2. In the Middle: Pennsylvania 
While Arkansas provides almost no added protections to domestic 
violence victims, other states are taking steps that, although far from 
ideal, improve state gun relinquishment efforts. Pennsylvania, for 
example, has passed some gun relinquishment laws, but has not adopted 
 
 194. Frattaroli, supra note 173, at 19. 
 195. Domestic Violence and Firearms in Arkansas, Law Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence (Aug. 4, 
2015), http://smartgunlaws.org/domestic-violence-and-firearms-in-arkansas/; Every Town for Gun 
Safety, supra note 111, at 15. 
 196. Domestic Violence and Firearms in Arkansas, supra note 195. 
 197. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-85-714 (West 2015); see also id. § 5.73.110. 
 198. Melissa Jeltsen, This Is How a Domestic Violence Victim Falls Through the Cracks, 
Huffington Post (Mar. 27, 2015, 4:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/16/domestic-
violence_n_5474177.html. 
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the most far-reaching measures to keep firearms out of the hands of 
domestic abusers. Pennsylvania’s laws provide a great deal of discretion 
to courts in deciding whether to require offenders to relinquish their 
firearms, and the statutes themselves are more lenient than they should 
be to effectuate far-reaching change. Pennsylvania prohibits individuals 
subject to the Lautenberg Amendment from purchasing firearms.199 
Pennsylvania law also requires those offenders subject to the Lautenberg 
Amendment to transfer their firearms to a nonprohibited person within 
“a reasonable period of time, not to exceed 60 days.”200 In addition, there 
are Pennsylvania statutes that authorize, but do not require, courts to 
prohibit subjects of restraining orders from possessing guns.201 Moreover, 
state law in Pennsylvania authorizes, but does not require, courts to 
enforce gun relinquishment from individuals subject to a domestic 
violence restraining order.202 While these provisions are indicative of a 
greater understanding of the necessity of strong local laws, they allow too 
much discretion for the judiciary. Further, they do not require a quick 
transfer of offenders’ firearms, which unquestionably diminishes the 
effect of the transfer as an offender is likely to be most upset (and 
dangerous) immediately following a conviction or issuance of a restraining 
order. States can, and some do, take more steps to seize firearms from 
domestic violence perpetrators. It is important to examine the most 
progressive states in order to recognize the potential states have to 
achieve success in the realm of gun relinquishment. 
3. Most Progressive: California 
Some states have taken significant steps toward enforcing the 
federal firearms prohibitions by reinforcing them with stronger state 
laws. For example, California law prohibits offenders from owning or 
possessing firearms.203 Significantly, California law pertains not only to 
convicted misdemeanants, but also to those who have only been charged 
with a misdemeanor.204 By broadening the reach of the firearm statutes to 
offenders who have been charged, California takes a substantial step in 
protecting victims in a timely manner. When victims do not have to wait 
for a conviction, firearms are, theoretically, removed from offenders’ 
hands at a much earlier time in the process. Timing is of utmost 
 
 199. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6105(c)(9) (2015). 
 200. Id. § 6105(a)(2)(i) (the nonprohibited person may not be a member of the person’s 
household). 
 201. Id. § 6105(a.1); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 6102(a), 6108(a)(7) (2015) (applying also to restraining 
orders arising from incidents involving current or former sexual or intimate partners). 
 202. 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 6108–6108.3 (noting guns may be surrendered to law enforcement, a 
licensed dealer, or a third party who has received a special “safekeeping permit” from law 
enforcement). 
 203. Cal. Penal Code § 29,805 (West 2015); id. §§ 136.2(a)(1)(G)(I)–(II), (d)(1)–(3). 
 204. Cal. Penal Code § 136.2(G)(ii)(I) (West 2015). 
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importance in these cases because the initiation of legal proceedings can 
spark the end of the relationship, which is oftentimes the most dangerous 
time for victims.205 Moreover, upon service of a domestic violence 
restraining order, the respondent must relinquish any firearms by 
surrendering them to a law enforcement officer upon request or within 
twenty-four hours if no request is made.206 The order itself contains a 
notice that informs the respondent of his obligation to relinquish her 
firearms.207 California law goes far beyond federal law in that those 
subject to stalking restraining orders are also required to surrender their 
weapons.208 Within forty-eight hours of being served, the offender must 
file a receipt of transfer, produced by a law enforcement officer or gun 
dealer, with the court and the law enforcement agency that served the 
restraining order.209 California law also allows the issuance of a search 
warrant when an offender subject to a restraining order does not 
surrender her firearms.210 Search warrants are also available to law 
enforcement when a firearm is present at the scene of a crime of domestic 
violence involving a threat to human life or physical assault.211 
In comparison to the federal laws that are silent on the matter, 
California law goes further by helping courts determine whether a 
defendant has complied with the gun relinquishment laws. Rule 4.700 of 
the California Rules of Court provides California courts with a firearm 
relinquishment protocol in cases of domestic violence misdemeanants 
that helps determine whether a defendant has complied with the court’s 
relinquishment order.212 The rule has several components. First, if a court 
 
 205. See Chris Godsey & Renita Robinson, Post-Separation Abuse Featured in the New Duluth 
Power and Control Wheel, 18 Domestic Violence Rep. 81, 81 (2013). 
 206. Cal. Fam. Code § 6389 (West 2015).  
If no request is made by a law enforcement officer, the relinquishment must occur within 24 
hours of being served the order, either by surrender to a law enforcement officer or sale to a 
licensed gun dealer. The court may grant an exemption from the relinquishment 
requirements for a particular firearm if the respondent can show that it is necessary as a 
condition of continued employment and that the current employer is unable to reassign the 
respondent to another position where a firearm is unnecessary. 
Domestic Violence and Firearms in California, Law Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence n.15 (Oct. 29, 
2015), http://smartgunlaws.org/domestic-violence-and-firearms-in-california/. 
 207. Fam. § 6389(b) (“On all forms providing notice that a protective order has been requested or 
granted, the Judicial Council shall include a notice that, upon service of the order, the respondent shall 
be ordered to relinquish possession or control of any firearms and not to purchase or receive or 
attempt to purchase or receive any firearms for a period not to exceed the duration of the restraining 
order.”). 
 208. Cal. Penal Code § 29,825(d) (West 2015) (referencing Penal § 29,830). 
 209. Fam. § 6389(c)(2); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 527.9(a), (b), (d) (West 2015); see also Penal 
§§ 136.2(d), 29,825(d); Civ. Proc. §§ 527.6(t)(2), 527.8(r)(2), 527.85(r)(2); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 
§ 15,657.03(t)(2). 
 210. Penal § 1524(a)(11). 
 211. Penal § 1524(a)(9). 
 212. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.700(b) (2015). 
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has “good cause to believe” that a defendant owns, possesses, or controls 
a firearm, the court must set a review hearing to determine compliance 
within two days of the issuance of the criminal restraining order.213 
Second, the rule specifies procedures for the review hearing to determine 
whether the defendant has complied.214 Lastly, the rule provides remedies 
if the court finds that the defendant has indeed failed to relinquish a 
firearm.215 Specifically, upon determination that the defendant has a gun, 
the rule allows courts to arrest the defendant, set bail, and issue a bench 
warrant for failure to appear at the hearing.216 Rule 4.700 is progressive 
because it provides courts with mandatory guidelines to maximize the 
enforcement of the gun relinquishment laws. Moreover, it removes a 
great deal of the court’s discretion and compels judges to actively remove 
firearms from offenders’ hands while providing courts accessible 
remedies if or when an offender does not comply. These laws work as 
evidenced by one program in San Mateo County, California, where a 
sergeant boasted of three years without any domestic violence homicides.217 
In 2012, that same program had 324 guns seized or surrendered from 
eighty-one people, using a careful system of restraining order 
examination and follow through.218 California provides a phenomenal 
example of a state statutory scheme that exhibits awareness and specifies 
actual guidelines for the different entities to make implementation 
possible. 
With the grave deficiencies of the federal statutes, stringent and 
wide-reaching state laws are necessary to achieve the intentions that 
propelled the federal firearm statutes to passage. Examination of the 
state laws, however, presents a diverse picture, illustrating some 
exceptionally progressive statutes, others that are severely lacking in 
foresight, and still others that fall somewhere in the middle. It is important 
to understand the criticisms of these state laws in order to recognize where 
the limitations exist and to develop superior laws in the future. 
 
 213. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.700(c)(2) (noting that under certain circumstances, the review 
hearing can take place up to five days after issuance of the criminal protective order, or if in custody, 
within two days after the defendant is released). 
 214. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.700(d) (noting that the court must give the defendant the 
opportunity to refute the allegation of possession of firearms). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. (“If . . . defendant has a firearm . . . the court must consider whether bail . . . [or] release on 
own recognizance is appropriate. If defendant does not appear at the hearing and the court orders that 
bail be revoked, the court should issue a bench warrant.”). 
 217. Michael Luo, In Some States, Gun Rights Trump Orders of Protection, N.Y. Times (Mar. 17, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/us/facing-protective-orders-and-allowed-to-keep-guns.html?_r=0. 
 218. Id. 
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B. Criticisms of State Firearms Laws 
As discussed above in Part II.A, there is a wide breadth of approaches 
that states take to enforce (or fail to enforce) the relinquishment of 
firearms by domestic violence offenders. More often than not, states are 
failing to enact sufficient legislation. Whether they are allowing too much 
discretion, requiring too many conditions, or seemingly ignoring the 
necessity of relinquishment laws, most states are simply not doing what is 
necessary to keep firearms out of the hands of domestic violence 
perpetrators. This Part will discuss the numerous problems that are 
rampant amongst the state firearm laws. 
The state firearm relinquishment laws must provide local law 
enforcement with a clear standard for enforcement in order to redress 
the lack of direction in the federal laws. However, more often than not, 
the statutes do not deliver at all. In thirty states, no state laws prohibit all 
domestic violence misdemeanants and all restraining order subjects from 
buying or using guns.219 Moreover, forty states do not require domestic 
abusers to relinquish their guns.220 The majority of states offer no 
protocol to ensure that abusers surrender their firearms. Without the 
proper methods of enforcement, the entire gun relinquishment program 
is rendered essentially meaningless. 
In the remaining states that do have gun relinquishment laws on the 
books, the laws provide only limited guidance.221 For example, in 
Tennessee, the statutes specify minimal requirements for courts issuing 
qualifying restraining orders.222 First, the statutes provide that the 
restraining order shall, on its face (1) notify the respondent of the 
requirement to surrender any firearms within forty-eight hours; (2) notify 
the respondent that possession of a firearm is prohibited as long as the 
order is in effect, and (3) notify the respondent of any penalties for 
violating the gun relinquishment laws.223 In addition to the written notice 
on the restraining order, the court must also tell the respondent to 
relinquish any firearms within forty-eight hours and to fill out and return 
a firearm dispossession affidavit.224 Further, the court shall notify local 
law enforcement agencies of the issuance and provisions of the order.225 
 
 219. Every Town for Gun Safety, supra note 111, at 3. 
 220. Id. This number has been altered to reflect the new state laws that have been enacted in 2015. 
 221. See, e.g., Guidelines for the Relinquishment and Storage of Firearms, Vt. Dep’t of Pub. Safety 
3 (2014), http://dps.vermont.gov/sites/dps/files/Guidelines%20for%20Firearms%206-18-14.pdf (providing 
a sample protocol for gun relinquishment). 
 222. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-625 (West 2015). 
 223. Id. §§ 36-3-625(a)(1)-(3). 
 224. Id. §§ 36-3-625(b)(1)-(2), (c). There are special loopholes for respondents who are licensed 
federal firearm dealers or “a responsible party under a federal firearms license” that allow these 
respondents to keep their gun “inventory” if there are “one . . . or more individuals who are 
responsible parties under the federal license who are not the respondent . . . .” Id. § 36-3-625(f)(2). 
 225. Id. 36-3-625(b)(1)-(2),(c). 
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Strikingly absent from these statutes are any guidelines as to how to 
enforce these laws. Without any federal or local guidance, judicial and 
law enforcement agencies are left to guess how to implement a 
relinquishment protocol. Again, state judiciaries and law enforcement 
agencies are, or should be, aware that abusers are required to relinquish 
their firearms. However, aside from state laws reiterating those laws, they 
do not provide much practical guidance as to enforcement mechanisms, 
leaving these agencies without the resources to successfully implement the 
laws. 
While the objective of removing firearms from perpetrators’ hands 
is of utmost importance, the person allowed to receive the firearm as a 
result of relinquishment can be just as significant. Generally, if state laws 
specify to whom offenders may transfer their firearms, offenders are 
given the option between: (1) a law enforcement officer, or (2) a third-
party who is not a household member.226 In light of the Henderson v. 
United States decision, discussed in Part I.C above, these options are not 
going to change because the Supreme Court recognized the right of those 
subject to § 922(g) to select the recipient of the prohibited firearms. 
Given that the third party can be a friend or family member living 
outside the home,227 this option is fraught with peril. In situations where 
the abuser has access to the third party’s home, such as a parent or close 
friend, the relinquishment might provide little or no protection for the 
victim. A third party might simply return the gun to the offender out of 
fear of harm, or a determined abuser might easily steal back the firearm 
unbeknownst to the third party, leaving the victim in a vulnerable, 
unprotected position. The innumerable ways in which an offender could 
manipulate her way into gaining access to the “relinquished” firearm 
makes the third-party option highly unappealing, if not absolutely 
dangerous and irresponsible. This prominent gap in the relinquishment 
laws is not the only problem, however. 
Aside from the legal options, there are numerous illegal ways that 
offenders can reacquire guns, including the black market, straw 
purchasers, and gun shows. Both state and federal gun relinquishment 
laws rely on the notion that all firearms are accurately registered in gun 
registries. However, an enormous black market exists for stolen guns. 
Each year in the United States, more than half a million guns are stolen, 
 
 226. See, e.g., 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 6108–6108.3 (2015). 
 227. Some state laws require that the third party obtain a special “safekeeping permit” from law 
enforcement. Id. In order to obtain a “safekeeping permit,” one must not be prohibited from 
possessing guns and must execute an affidavit acknowledging that the respondent cannot obtain the 
firearm until law enforcement authorizes the return. Id. 
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many of which are then sold illegally.228 The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) identifies three common ways that 
firearms illegally end up in the hands of criminals.229 First, there are 
corrupt licensed gun dealers who sell guns “off the books” to both 
private sellers and criminals.230 Second, there are straw purchasers, those 
with a clean record who purchase firearms for prohibited persons.231 This 
is the most common means through which prohibited persons acquire 
firearms.232 Third, as discussed previously, gun shows and private gun 
sales provide an exceptional loophole for prohibited persons to purchase 
firearms without fear of being subject to a background check.233 These 
illegal opportunities undermine the foundation of the relinquishment 
laws as they are dependent upon the ability of courts and law enforcement 
to know of the presence of firearms in reach of the offenders. 
With such a large number of unregistered firearms in the United 
States,234 gun relinquishment laws effectively become an honor system for 
domestic violence offenders. Judges can instruct an offender to surrender 
all firearms, but if there are no agencies that can trace a registered gun to 
that offender, there is no way of knowing whether the offender complies. 
Furthermore, domestic abusers tend to be extremely manipulative, 
oftentimes deceiving others into believing they are nonviolent people.235 
This manipulation can easily spill over into the courtroom, convincing 
judges and law enforcement that there are no firearms to relinquish. 
Without the evidence of the registration of a gun, offenders can easily 
retain possession of their weapons. 
In general, state firearm relinquishment laws, if they exist, are 
overwhelmingly insufficient. Like the federal firearm statutes, most of 
 
 228. Philip J. Cook & James A. Leitzel, “Smart” Guns: A Technological Fix for Regulating the 
Secondary Market 7 (Terry Sanford Inst. of Pub. Policy, Duke Univ., Working Paper Series SAN01-10, 
2001). 
 229. Dep’t of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, Following the Gun: 
Enforcing Federal Laws Against Firearms Traffickers 10 (June 2000). 
 230. Id.; see also Mayors Against Illegal Guns, Inside Straw Purchasing: How Criminals Get 
Guns Illegally 3 (2013) (“More than 85 percent of dealers in the U.S. had no crime guns traced to 
them at all in 1998, while about 1 percent of licensed firearm dealers accounted for 57 percent of traces 
that same year.”).  
 231. Mayors Against Illegal Guns, supra note 230, at 9 (noting that straw purchasers are often 
relatives or intimate partners). 
 232. Id. at 4 (noting statistics that reveal almost half of all trafficking investigations lead back to 
straw purchasing). 
 233. Id. at 20; see also Press Release, Violence Pol’y Ctr., Gun Shows Have Become “Tupperware 
Parties for Criminals” New Violence Policy Center Study Reveals (July 17, 1996) (on file with author) 
(“Gun shows have become ‘[t]upperware [p]arties for [c]riminals.”). 
 234. In 2012, an estimated 190,342 guns were lost or stolen in the United States. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 2012 Summary: Firearms Reported 
Lost and Stolen 4 (2013). 
 235. Lundy Bancroft, Understanding the Batterer in Custody and Visitation Disputes, Lundy 
Bancroft (1998). 
Gildengorin-67.3.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2016 10:25 PM 
April 2016]           FIREARM RELINQUISHMENT LAWS 841 
the state laws also fail to provide the judiciaries and local law 
enforcement agencies with adequate standards for implementation. The 
shortcomings of these laws have a direct influence on the ability of the 
local entities, including both judiciaries and law enforcement, to remove 
guns from domestic violence offenders. Acknowledging this reality of 
ineffective legislation and poor enforcement, reform efforts ought to be 
considered in order to better protect victims and society at large. 
III.  Proposals for Reform 
The ultimate goal of the federal gun prohibitions is to protect 
domestic violence victims from harm at the hands of their former or 
current intimate partners.236 In order to effectuate that goal, gun 
relinquishment protocols must be established at the state level, with the 
support of federal agencies. This Part introduces three possible reforms 
to improve current relinquishment laws. First, Congress should provide 
states with the funding necessary to implement standard gun 
relinquishment protocols. Second, Congress should provide states with a 
set of mandatory guidelines for the enforcement of the gun relinquishment 
laws. Lastly, the background check system must be improved and more 
widely used. By implementing these reforms, the removal of firearms 
from prohibited persons could increase drastically thereby saving innocent 
lives. 
A. Funding and Incentives for States to Implement Relinquishment 
Laws 
In order to be operative, federal relinquishment laws depend on 
implementation by local law enforcement. However, this dependence 
places a serious financial burden on states to carry out a federal statute. 
It is clear that some members of Congress understand what is necessary 
to ensure that states are able to carry out the federal relinquishment laws 
because they have attempted to pass funding bills with these exact goals 
in mind.237 Although the Supreme Court has limited the ability of 
Congress to force state legislatures to adopt federal law,238 Congress is 
still able to influence states through the use of its spending power.239 
Therefore, Congress should use its spending power to incentivize state 
legislatures to adopt, as state law, the federal relinquishment laws as a 
 
 236. “Intimate partners” as defined by the federal statutes includes parents and children.  
 237. Domestic Violence Criminal Disarmament Act of 2013, H.R. 3566, 113th Cong. (2013); 
Domestic Violence Gun Homicide Prevention Act of 2014, S. 2676 113th Cong. (2014). 
 238. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 146 (1992) (establishing the “anti-commandeering 
principle,” which asserts that Congress cannot compel state legislatures to adopt federal law as state 
law). 
 239. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) 
(holding that Congress can make federal funds conditional upon certain state actions). 
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minimum. Accordingly, the federal government could provide states with 
monetary incentives for passing relinquishment laws meeting certain 
criteria. As an example, states may be funded for the implementation of 
state laws that: (1) require the relinquishment of firearms; (2) require law 
enforcement officers to seize firearms at a domestic violence crime scene; 
(3) require judges to provide notice of an offender’s obligation to 
relinquish her firearms; and (4) allow law enforcement officers to search 
an offender’s home if there is probable cause to believe that the offender 
has firearms. Further, the federal government might create a tiered 
system that rewards states for implementing specific relinquishment 
protocols. As a check, the federal government should require annual 
statistics on the number of relinquished firearms and number of domestic 
violence homicides in order for the states to qualify for the funding. 
Opponents might argue that this would create a system where state 
agencies begin to intrude into the lives of their citizens. However, as seen 
in California, the use of careful relinquishment protocols does not 
remove the constitutional rights afforded to citizens. They do, however, 
protect domestic violence victims. At the very least, this would provide a 
significant increase in protection to victims who are in one of the forty 
states that do not mandate gun relinquishment. 
Local law enforcement, with the support of federal funding, would 
be incentivized to adopt a more responsive attitude toward enforcing 
federal provisions and ensuring that offenders surrender their firearms. 
Although some states might remain politically opposed to gun 
relinquishment, a strong funding source can provide proponents with the 
necessary bargaining power to propose and implement gun 
relinquishment laws that state legislatures would more readily support.240 
Furthermore, funding would provide law enforcement agencies with the 
ability to create specialized units to enforce the gun relinquishment 
provisions. By way of comparison, an agency comprised of officers 
lacking the requisite knowledge about the nature and risk inherent in a 
domestic violence situation might not prioritize the enforcement of these 
provisions. Instead, a specialized unit of local officers, funded by the 
federal government, could be comprised of officers with the knowledge, 
the resources, and the doggedness necessary to actually make significant 
progress in the surrendering of firearms by offenders. 
Federal funding could also provide states with the ability to increase 
judicial training. Although the proposed protocol, discussed below, 
would reduce judicial discretion, judicial training in the area of gun 
relinquishment laws in the context of domestic violence could improve 
judicial response and avoid noncompliance. Judicial training in this area 
 
 240. Jennifer L. Vainik, Note, Kiss, Kiss, Bang, Bang: How Current Approaches to Guns and 
Domestic Violence Fail to Save Women’s Lives, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1111, 1146 (2007). 
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should include a thorough education about: (1) the psychology of 
domestic violence; (2) the dangers of domestic violence; (3) how firearms 
increase the danger to victims; (4) how to provide adequate notice of an 
offender’s relinquishment duty; and (5) protocols to ensure follow up on 
firearm relinquishment. Some might argue that the reduction of judicial 
discretion should be avoided because it removes the ability of judges to 
use individualized analyses to decide an offender’s fate. While this might 
be true, the data proves that domestic violence offenders are 
manipulative and that allowing them to possess guns is exceedingly 
dangerous.241 Removing a judge’s ability to sidestep the federal and local 
laws would further the worthy goal of protecting victims. With training, 
judges would be more aware of the dangers of guns in the hands of 
domestic violence offenders, fostering a more empathic understanding of 
the intricacies involved in violent relationships. This type of training 
could also lead to judges having a better understanding of their own role 
in keeping the firearms away from offenders, possibly increasing the 
judges’ sense of accountability to these victims. 
B. Federal Guidelines for State Implementation of 
Relinquishment Laws 
One of the most glaring shortcomings in the federal gun 
relinquishment laws is the lack of guidelines or protocol as to how to 
actually implement these laws. The facilitation of a domestic violence 
offender’s surrender of firearms is a nuanced and complicated procedure, 
calling on several levels of government agencies and actors, from 
prosecutors to judges to law enforcement officers. As such, the federal 
government should create a step-by-step protocol that would act as a 
minimum for state enforcement of the federal guidelines, backed by the 
funding described above. Ideally, state legislatures would adopt these 
enforcement statutes, allowing state prosecutors, as well as federal 
prosecutors, to charge offenders found to have violated relinquishment 
laws.242 
An effective protocol should outline each step in the process of 
relinquishment. The beginning of the relinquishment process should 
begin when a court issues a restraining order (including ex parte orders) 
 
 241. See Ill. Coal. Against Domestic Violence, Achieving Accountability in Domestic 
Violence Cases: A Practical Guide for Reducing Domestic Violence 2 (2005) (noting that “[t]oo 
many perpetrators are skilled at manipulating the system effectively to further their aims and punish 
their victims”); see also Domestic Violence and Firearms Policy Summary, supra note 22. 
 242. “Double prosecution [by the federal and state governments] is permissible . . . because the 
respective governments are ‘two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of 
dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory.’” Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra 
in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 65, 68 (2006) 
(quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)). 
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or an offender is charged with a domestic violence misdemeanor. At that 
point, the judge should hear testimony from both the victim and the 
offender regarding the ownership of firearms.243 The victim’s testimony is 
particularly important here as it can provide the courts with information 
about gun ownership, especially unregistered guns that the offender 
might be concealing. Preferably, the victim would be able to testify, 
orally or in writing, outside of the offender’s presence in order to reduce 
fear and intimidation, and therefore decrease the likelihood of the victim 
withholding information. If the victim and offender give conflicting 
information regarding the current possession of weapons, and the court 
is unable to resolve the conflict, the case should be transferred to the 
district attorney’s office for further proceedings.244 
Second, and no matter the initial finding on current weapon status, 
the judge should inform the offender of the federal245 gun relinquishment 
requirement, and the offender should be required to complete a standard 
“statement of firearms” form, listing all firearms currently in her 
possession246 and providing a clear outline of the gun prohibition.247 The 
judge, as well as the order, should explain that the offender has forty-
eight hours to relinquish any firearms to law enforcement.248 
Relinquishment should only be allowed to law enforcement officers or 
licensed gun dealers. If a third party wants to purchase a firearm, she 
should have to go through a licensed gun dealer to purchase it. Next, in 
order to monitor compliance, the judge should set up a “firearms 
surrender hearing,” during which the offender must prove compliance by 
providing the court with a receipt indicating that the firearms have been 
turned over to police officers. Victims should also be able to inform the 
court at this stage of whether they believe that the offender is complying 
with the relinquishment order. If an offender fails to surrender firearms 
in the allotted time period, does not appear at the hearing, or the victim 
provides credible testimony that the offender is not in compliance, this 
should lead to a warrant for the offender’s arrest. The warrant should 
 
 243. See, e.g., Sack, supra note 31, at 18–19 (discussing the Miami-Dade County, Florida protocol 
requiring a judge to make an “on-record” inquiry of each respondent to confirm the status of 
weapons). 
 244. See, e.g., Steven G. Brandl, Univ. Wis.-Milwaukee, An Evaluation of the Firearm 
Surrender Pilot in Wisconsin: Final Report 11 (2012). 
 245. Ideally, both federal law and state law would require relinquishment. However, as it stands, in 
states that do not require relinquishment, the judge would only need to inform the offender of the 
federal laws. 
 246. See, e.g., Brandl, supra note 244, at 10 (providing that a “statement of firearms” form was to 
be filled out by both the respondent and the petitioner in restraining order cases). 
 247. For full faith and credit purposes, alerting law enforcement in other states can be 
accomplished through the gun prohibition explanation on the form. See Sack, supra note 31, at 18. 
 248. See Vainik, supra note 240, at 1147–50 (discussing the possibility of Congress to provide 
funding for locally operated gun units where offenders would be required to safely relinquish their 
firearms). 
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also provide law enforcement officers with the authority to search the 
offender’s residence in order to seize the firearms.249 Rather than simply 
giving authorization for officers to conduct the search, the protocol 
should require the officers to conduct the search. 
There are vast benefits to the implementation of a protocol of this 
nature. At a minimum, this protocol would require judges to enforce the 
federal gun relinquishment laws in a strong and uniform manner. It 
would prevent judges from using their own discretion. These types of 
guidelines would also increase the accountability of offenders and force 
them to surrender their firearms, while providing victims with the 
opportunity to be heard. The guidelines would also make it easier for 
victim advocates and counsel to see where judges are not complying and 
are using their own discretion to evade the federal relinquishment laws.250 
By engaging the offenders on several levels, and having judges 
oversee their compliance with gun relinquishment provisions, there is a 
greater likelihood of positive results. It could be argued that offenders 
will still refuse to relinquish their firearms. However, on a threshold 
level, simply ensuring that the offenders are aware of the requirement to 
surrender their firearms would likely improve compliance. Moreover, 
having contact with a judge and law enforcement officers who are 
engaging with an offender and insisting on gun relinquishment could 
cause the offenders, who otherwise would simply ignore an initial 
relinquishment warning, to surrender her weapons. Engagement with the 
legal system is an important factor in ensuring obedience.251 Although it 
would be far from perfect, legal presence is necessary to make any 
improvements. 
Providing law enforcement officers with the authority to search and 
seize guns after noncompliance would be instrumental in improving 
relinquishment rates. Guidelines requiring the action of law enforcement 
officers would take away their discretion to act, ensuring that the 
relinquishment laws are enforced in greater numbers. Law enforcement 
officers would likely feel empowered to take action, as well, and might 
have a greater sense of urgency to protect domestic violence victims. 
C. Improvements in the Background Check Usage and Protocol 
The NICS is, in theory, an excellent idea. However, in practice, as 
discussed above, loopholes render the system worthless in many 
situations. The background check system must be overhauled. There 
should be a uniform system that provides a checkbox that officers or 
 
 249. See, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-B:5(II) (Supp. 2006) (giving the court the authority to 
issue a search warrant for seizure of all firearms). 
 250. See Vainik, supra note 240, at 1154. 
 251. See, e.g., Brandl, supra note 244, at 49 (“[G]reater legal attention on firearms may put the 
respondent on notice.”). 
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clerks can select to indicate that the underlying misdemeanor or 
restraining order subjects the offender to § 922(g) prohibitions. For ease 
of use, the orders themselves, filled out by the presiding judge, should 
include a similar checkbox system indicating whether the requisite 
relationship and minor use of force were present. Moreover, the states 
should be required to enter all of their data252 into the NICS. Although 
some states dread the breach of privacy, the use of strong data protection 
should stifle these fears. The introduction of an easy-to-use NICS 
electronic system would undoubtedly improve the accuracy of the 
current system. 
In order to prevent offenders from possessing guns, all sellers, 
including licensed and unlicensed dealers, should be required to conduct 
background checks prior to a gun sale. Conceding the fact that corrupt 
and illegal sellers will be elusive, simply increasing the number of dealers 
who are required to run background checks will improve the reach of the 
relinquishment laws by keeping firearms away from prohibited persons. 
The idea is to make purchasing a gun more difficult for offenders, which 
would prevent or at least slow down an offender looking to make a 
purchase. In addition, using background checks will improve the 
accuracy of gun registries. Consequently, law enforcement agencies and 
courts could use this information to determine the current status of 
weapons in cases where relinquishment is required. If stronger 
relinquishment protocols are implemented, there must also be a system 
to prevent the offender from simply purchasing another firearm. 
In as much as the federal laws can only attain their goals with the 
support of state and local laws, the need for strong, explicit state laws is 
apparent. The federal government could take certain steps to lessen the 
burden on individual states, such as providing a complete guide to 
relinquishment protocols and incentives to implement those protocols. 
Extra resources could also allow states to improve the background check 
systems and provide training to the different entities that are responsible 
for carrying out the protocols. Granted, it is unrealistic to believe that 
these systems will be able to remove all handguns from all prohibited 
persons. Nonetheless, there is a wide variety of improvements that can 
bring us closer to this goal. 
Conclusion 
Victims of domestic violence deserve to be protected. At the point 
where victims are reaching out to the court system and law enforcement 
agencies, it is the responsibility of the legal system to take the necessary 
 
 252. This data would include: (1) temporary and permanent restraining orders; (2) relationship 
between victims and offenders; (3) presence of a gun at the crime scene; and (4) misdemeanor 
convictions. 
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steps to prevent more violence. The first step is to get the guns out of the 
hands of offenders. With the current awareness and understanding about 
the risks involved with domestic offenders and guns, the federal 
government must use its resources to quickly and efficiently disarm 
batterers. Although federal law has drastically improved over a relatively 
short period of time, the federal and state governments should work 
together to create the necessary relinquishment protocols. The most 
powerful tool that the federal government has is its funding power. 
Federal funding can be used to influence the states’ adoption of stringent 
enforcement of relinquishment laws. By providing states with a set of 
guidelines, funded by the federal government, and changing the background 
check system, the federal government would ensure that victims across the 
nation are one step closer to being safe and finding support in their 
communities. 
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